9 The decision on the facts in O'Brien, as noted in the text below, was that the impugned evidence had been obtained in breach of legal and not constitutional rights and that the trial judge had correctly employed his discretion to admit the evidence. Accordingly it might be considered that comments relating to the exclusionary rule on unconstitutionally obtained evidence within the judgments are obiter dicta. However, there is no doubting the fact that the rule on unconstitutionally obtained evidence stems from this case and McGrath suggests that any question as to the true ratio decedendi of O'Brien is of academic interest only at this juncture as the judgment of Walsh J., which contains the two-tiered approach, has generally come to be regarded as containing the ratio of the case: McGrath, D. Evidence (Dublin: Thomson Round Hall, 2005) , para.7.07 fn.23. 10 For example, People (D.P.P.) "… [E] vidence obtained by invasion of the constitutional personal rights of a citizen must be excluded unless a court is satisfied that either the act constituting the breach of constitutional rights was committed unintentionally or accidentally, or is satisfied that there are extraordinary excusing circumstances which justify the admission of the evidence in [the court's] discretion." 11 Finlay CJ acknowledged that the adoption of this high protectionist stance could create problems in criminal trials given its propensity to exclude evidence of immense probative value. However, he was of the opinion that:
" [T] he detection of crime and the conviction of guilty persons, no matter how important they may be to the ordering of society, cannot … outweigh the unambiguously expressed constitutional obligation 'as far as practicable to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen '." 12 Resultantly, for the past twenty-five years, evidence has been excluded at trial in Ireland where it has been obtained in breach of the constitutional rights of the accused, and the actions of the gardaí which led to the breach could not be said to have been accidental or unintentional.
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How strict is strict?
The majority of the Supreme Court in JC seemed eager to present the Kenny rule as an absolute rule of exclusion which has been operating in an overly strict manner. O'Donnell J., for example, stated that "one of the troubling features of Kenny is that it adopts a rule on its face qualified, but 11 [1990] The Kenny rule was never universally popular. Indeed, strong dissents were issued by two of the Supreme Court bench in the case itself: Griffin and Lynch JJ. favoured a deterrence-based approach centred on proof of blameworthiness, culpability or unfairness in terms of the evidence-gathering procedures 26 and preferred to interpret "deliberate and conscious breach" as applying to the intentions of the gardaí rather than their actions.
More recently, the majority of the Balance in the Criminal Law Review Group, an ad hoc committee established by the Minister for Justice in 2006 to examine a number of issues within criminal procedure, advocated a change to the Kenny rule. They argued that a trial judge should have discretion to admit unconstitutionally obtained evidence, having regard to the totality of the circumstances in a given case, with particular regard to the rights of the victim. 27 The Chairman of the Committee, Dr Gerard Hogan SC (now a judge of the Irish Court of Appeal), added a note of dissent from the majority view on this issue wherein he stated:
"Our society has committed itself to abiding by the rule of law and to respect and vindicate the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. It behoves us to take these rights and freedoms seriously and if the occasional exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence is the price of respecting these constitutional rights, then that is a price society should be prepared to pay in the interests of upholding the values solemnly enshrined in our highest law. on a burglary charge excluded from evidence at trial. He had been arrested on the basis of a match between fingerprints taken from the scene and prints that had been taken from him in relation to another matter some years previously which were held on file. The prosecution had been unable to state clearly the legal position of the retained prints, specifically, whether or not they ought to have been destroyed following the passage of time and the fact that no proceedings had been instituted in relation to the earlier matter.
Although Charleton J., in the High Court, had deemed the Kenny rule to be inapplicable on the facts, he took some time in his judgment to outline his grievances with the rule, stating that " [a] rule which remorselessly excludes evidence obtained through an illegality occurring by a mistake does not commend itself to the proper ordering of society which is the purpose of the criminal warrants were now viewed as unconstitutional, the Circuit Court judge effectively found that there had been no lawful authority in the warrant to allow the gardaí to enter JC's dwelling and thereafter effect an arrest. Accordingly, and because there was no evidence to support any claim that the gardaí had entered the dwelling on foot of any other legal power, the accused was in unlawful custody at the time when he made the inculpatory statements, which were therefore inadmissible. Under the Kenny rule, this was absolutely the correct outcome of the circumstances which arose before the Circuit Criminal Court. This is a most unsatisfactory approach to the interpretation of s 23. It required significant linguistic acrobatics by the Supreme Court and it opened up the possibility that the respondent might be retried on the basis of the new exclusionary rule which was about to be set out by the Court, despite the fact that the trial judge had correctly applied the law as it had stood for almost a quarter of a century. As noted by McKechnie J (dissenting), even if no retrial was ordered, the finding of the Supreme Court in this case that there was compelling evidence which was wrongly excluded could lead to an ongoing query of guilt over the respondent, despite his acquittal.
McKechnie J declared the use of s 23 in this case a "… frontal attack on the acquittal" which would leave "…a public blur on the character of the respondent who has no legal means of correcting that life lasting stigma." 
The new exclusionary rule
The fundamental and express decision of the majority of the Irish Supreme Court in DPP v JC was that the Kenny case was erroneously decided and that the exclusionary rule as set out therein is no longer to be applied. There is some indication in the majority judgments that modern developments in terms of garda accountability and suspect rights might have led to the view that the Kenny rule is no longer appropriate, 36 although the actual decision is to the effect that it was erroneously decided from the start. The newly-stated rule, while there is more to it than this (as discussed below), allows for evidence obtained in inadvertent breach of constitutional rights to be admitted at trial while evidence obtained in knowing, reckless or grossly negligent breach must be excluded, except in exceptional circumstances.
Six separate judgments were issued by the Supreme Court (the Chief Justice did not issue a judgment of her own, but concurred with the majority), amounting to over 155,000 words. The majority acknowledged the difficult balance to be achieved by the need to ensure that all potentially relevant evidence is considered at a criminal trial and the need to ensure that 34 In any event, the rule as now constructed is set out clearly in the judgment of Clarke J, 45 and he helpfully provides clear reasons for the inclusion of each individual aspect of this rule. The main elements are as follows:
 The onus is on the prosecution to establish the admissibility of all evidence.
 If a claim is raised that evidence was obtained in breach of constitutional rights, the onus is on the prosecution to establish either (i) that there was no unconstitutionality, or (ii) that despite any interference with constitutional rights the evidence should still be admitted.  Where evidence is obtained in deliberate and conscious violation of constitutional rights (in the sense of knowing breach of rights) it should be excluded, except in exceptional circumstances.
 Whether or not a breach of constitutional rights was deliberate and conscious requires analysis of the conduct or state of mind of the individual who actually gathered the evidence, as well as any senior official or officials within the investigating or enforcement authority concerned who was involved either in that decision or in decisions of that type generally or in putting in place policies concerning evidence-gathering of the type concerned.
 Where evidence was taken in breach of constitutional rights, but this was not deliberate and conscious, there is a presumption in favour of exclusion, which can be rebutted by evidence that the breach of rights was either (i) inadvertent or (ii) derived from subsequent legal developments.
Basically, while the Kenny rule operated on a rationale of protectionism, the JC rule operates on a rationale of deterrence: evidence will not be excluded if it was obtained in inadvertent breach of constitutional rights. Hardiman J (dissenting) profoundly objected to the "finding that 'inadvertence' by public officials with coercive powers will sufficiently excuse a breach of a citizen's constitutional rights to allow material obtained by such breach to be proved in evidence against that citizen." 46 He stated that he regarded this "as a gratuitous writing down of the respect due to the Constitution, which is an absolutely retrograde step which I deeply deplore." 47 "Deliberate and Conscious" Breach of Rights (again)
The shift from protectionism to deterrence in JC was partly achieved through the determination that the term "deliberate and conscious" relates to the state of mind of the person obtaining the evidence (and/or any relevant senior officials) rather than his/her actions. One might have thought that in boldly overruling the Kenny case, as the majority of the Supreme Court has expressly done in JC, it would have been better to avoid this particular turn of phrase altogether, as its meaning has been so contentious over the years since O'Brien and on through Kenny. breach of constitutional rights will be excluded, except in exceptional circumstances. So, "deliberate and conscious" breach of rights also includes reckless and grossly negligent breach of rights, which the everyday meaning of "deliberate and conscious" might not readily impart.
What will be the impact of a "deliberate and conscious" breach of rights, within the meaning of the JC rule? It seems that a garda who knows he holds an invalid search warrant will obtain evidence that will later be excluded; a garda who is subjectively reckless, in the sense that he knows there is a risk that the warrant he holds may be invalid, will obtain evidence that will later be excluded; and, a garda who takes an objectively unreasonable risk that the warrant he holds may be invalid which falls so far below the standard of care that he ought to take in executing a warrant that it amounts to gross negligence, will also obtain evidence that will later be excluded.
Only a garda who has no idea that the warrant he holds may be invalid will obtain evidence that can be admitted.
The exact operation of the new rule in practice obviously remains to be seen in individual, subsequent cases. But, it seems possible that the outcome could be something of a reversal of the dichotomy which has come about since Unconstitutionality derived from subsequent legal developments A further notable aspect of the newly-stated rule is the notion that evidence ought to be admitted where its unconstitutionality arises as a result of a subsequent legal development. This matter is directly related to the facts of JC itself, given the impact of the finding of unconstitutionality in the Damache case between the execution of the warrant at JC's dwelling and his trial.
Under Kenny, the statements obtained in JC were correctly excluded. However, under the new JC rule, such statements would be admissible as although s 29 warrants are now invalid and could not be used to gain entry to a dwelling from the date of the Damache decision onwards, they were valid at the time of execution at JC's dwelling. This gives rise to some concern.
The constitutional difficulty with s 29 was that it allowed for warrants to be authorised by senior gardaí who were involved in the investigation for which the warrant was deemed necessary.
This, as the Supreme Court found in Damache, provided no independent oversight of garda conduct and inadequate protection for the rights of citizens. Section 29, accordingly, was struck down for good reason: independence and impartiality are essential to the integrity of the criminal process, and were not provided for by the s 29 procedure. The notion that because it was viewed as good law at the time of the execution of a specific warrant -largely because no case had yet made it to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality -evidence obtained thereunder should be admitted at a trial arising after it has been declared to be bad law, undermines the declaration of unconstitutionality. Perhaps more significantly this approach also draws the relevant trial court into acting upon evidence obtained in breach of the Constitution. Although the gardaí in the relevant circumstances were unaware of the unconstitutionality, as it had yet to be declared, a later trial court admitting and acting upon the evidence obtained does so knowing that such evidence was obtained in what are now viewed as unconstitutional circumstances. Surely this would bring the administration of justice into greater disrepute than any alleged frustration of a prosecution by the Kenny rule. The fact that Ireland is a small jurisdiction which generates a correspondingly limited pool of litigation makes this concern all the more profound; as Damache demonstrated, some time may elapse before a challenge to the constitutionality of a practice is raised before the courts. The approach advocated in JC would allow for evidence obtained under such a practice over the course of that time to be admitted at trial despite an eventual finding of unconstitutionality.
Conclusion
There are many more facets to the judgments in DPP v JC which will require attention in the fullness of time. The nuances of operating the new rule will only become apparent as cases come through the trial and appellate courts. What might be noted in conclusion at this juncture, however, is that the Kenny rule was one of the few remaining true "due process" aspects of Irish criminal procedure. While the Supreme Court recently enhanced the constitutional right to legal advice, by acknowledging that this right includes a prohibition on questioning a detained suspect prior to the arrival of his/her requested solicitor, 51 in recent years there has been much curtailment of suspect rights within the criminal process, both in the pre-trial investigative stage and at trial. Since the decision in Kenny, for example, we have seen extended detention periods,
